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The current debate over shareholder access to the issuer's
proxy statement for the purpose of making director nominations is
both overstated in its importance and misses the serious issue in
question. The Securities and Exchange Commission's ("SEC's") new e-
proxy rules, which permit reliance on proxy materials posted on a
website, should substantially reduce the production and distribution
cost differences between a meaningful contest waged via the issuer's
proxy and a freestanding proxy solicitation. No matter which avenue
is used, however, the serious question relates to the appropriate
disclosure required of a shareholder nominator. Should the nominator
be subject to the broad-ranging disclosure requirements now
associated with the freestanding contest? Or should there be curtailed
disclosure for a nominator (who disavows control motives) of a limited
number of directors whose election will not change control? The
inescapable costs lie in disclosure, not so much because of the drafting
costs, but because of the liability standard associated with the current
proxy solicitation rules. A party may be subject to a private suit for
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material misstatements or omissions in connection with a solicitation
even without a showing of scienter. Disclosure under such a regime
entails not only the up-front costs of precaution, but also the uncertain
(and potentially high) costs of litigation. These costs-not the
production, distribution, or other solicitation costs in an e-proxy-
eligible world-will constrain director nominations made by a "good
governance" activist without a large stake or a control motive. The
current regulatory round associated with the SEC's sidestepping of
the Second Circuit's proxy access opinion in AFSCME v. AIG1 is a
sideshow, diverting attention from this important issue.
2
Part I of this Essay briefly describes what shareholder access
to the issuer's proxy statement entails. Part II summarizes how we
have come to the present regulatory moment. Part III describes the e-
proxy rules that should lead us to refocus the debate. Part IV sets up
the key question: what is the appropriate disclosure (in content and
liability risk) to require of a shareholder nominator? One obvious
possible distinction is between nominators with and without control
motives; another is between instances in which the election of
shareholder nominees would or would not shift control of the board.
Packaged into the disclosure question are concerns about the
rising influence of institutional investors and the newly fashionable
issue of "agency capitalism," which focuses on the distinctive motives
and incentives of the agents for these institutions. 3 The longstanding
tradition in U.S. corporate law is that a shareholder "may vote as he
pleases," 4 subject to a set of constraints on controlling shareholders
who use the corporate machinery for self-dealing or other potentially
1. 462 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2006).
2. The SEC recently resolved the matter, at least temporarily, by deciding to "codify" what
it regarded as its "longstanding interpretation" of the applicable rules to permit exclusion of
shareholder proposals purporting to grant issuer proxy access to nominate directors. Press
Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Votes to Codify Longstanding Policy on Shareholder
Proposals on Election Procedures (Nov. 28, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-246.htm; see Shareholder Proposals Relating to the
Election of Directors, Exchange Act Release No. 56,914, Investment Company Act Release No.
28,075, 72 Fed. Reg. 70,450 (Dec. 11, 2007) (effective Jan. 11, 2008).
3. See Ronald J. Gilson, Leo Strine's Third Way: Responding to Agency Capitalism, 33 J.
CORP. L. 47, 52 (2007); Alex J. Pollock, Will the Real Shareholders Please Stand Up? Principals
and Agents in the Sarbanes-Oxley Era, FIN. SERVICES OUTLOOK, July 19, 2007,
http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.26512/pub-detail.asp ("Under this system of agency
capitalism, the ultimate principals-the real shareholders providing money at risk-have a lot of
agents, capital market managers as well as corporate managers, all of whom they pay, directly or
indirectly, and all of whom present principal-agent issues.").




improper purposes. 5 This view was sustained over a long mid-
twentieth century period, during which shareholder voting (outside of
a contest for control) diminished in significance in favor of
managerialist governance constrained (if at all) by control markets.
This move to managerialism was, in important part, the result of
increasingly diffuse share ownership, for which the free-rider and
other collective action problems provoked "exit" rather than "voice" by
the disgruntled shareholder.
6
But with the rise of institutional investors, the diffusion of
stock ownership has reversed course. The Berle-Means corporation of
the twenty-first century exhibits the traditional separation of
ownership from control, in that the owners still play no role in
management.7 But that separation has taken on a new form: instead
of millions of dispersed retail investors, we have hundreds (perhaps
thousands) of institutional investors who serve as financial
intermediaries. The ability of these institutional actors to coordinate
at a much lower cost changes the collective action equation and
rejuvenates a shareholder activism that depends on voting as a
credible mechanism for shareholder influence, even outside of a
control contest. At the risk of some overstatement, shareholder voting
now matters for the large U.S. public firm in ways it has not for
seventy-five years. Accordingly, the ramshackle voting system itself
needs reengineering.8 But are we also in need of a new law of
"shareholder duties" to offset potential pathologies? Perhaps a new set
of disclosure obligations? More narrowly, in the director nomination
context, should we be content with disclosure whose principal
touchstone is control? And outside of contests for control, should we
compel disclosure about the motives, objectives, and competence of the
various actors?
5. E.g., Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 937 (Del. 2003) (subjecting a
controlling shareholder to fiduciary duty constraints in entering into a voting agreement where
the disposition of control could be effected only through corporate action-here, a merger-rather
than through sale of stock (because of transfer restrictions on super-voting shares)).
6. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSE TO DECLINE IN FIRMS,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 46 (1970) ("[A]ny resort to voice rather than to exit [is] unthinkable
for any but the most committed stockholder.").
7. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 4 (1933) (noting the rise of the "quasi-public corporation: a corporation in
which a large measure of separation of ownership and control has taken place through the
multiplication of owners"). The text draws from John Armour & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Berle-
Means Corporation of the 21st Century (2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
8. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting 15-32




Part V concludes with some advice to institutional investor
activists. In particular, I suggest that preoccupation with access to the
issuer proxy has been a diversion from the development of more
effective shareholder activism. The e-proxy rules as now drafted
permit low-cost waging of a proxy contest. Do not mourn the non-
adoption of the SEC's proxy access proposal. Celebrate it, for it well
might have raised the cost to activist institutions of waging a proxy
contest because it suggested that disclosures relevant to "agency
capitalism" were necessarily material even in the case of an
independent proxy solicitation. Shareholder activists should devote
energy to working through the practical mechanics of undertaking e-
proxy contests. Instead of "just vote no," the next step should be "short
slate" proxy contests via e-proxy: "Just vote for Joe [or someone]."
Most institutional activists would prefer to work with a company's
independent nominating committee, particularly where board changes
seem appropriate. But to induce a fruitful negotiating climate,
institutional investors need to make a short slate campaign a credible
alternative.
The most significant e-proxy costs are the potential litigation
and liability risks associated with allegedly faulty disclosure. But
under the rules that are likely to emerge, those disclosure costs will
not be much lower (if at all) in the case of a proxy contest run through
the issuer's proxy statement. Moreover, in many cases the issuer will
contend that relevant material is materially misleading and will
refuse to include it in the proxy statement, which will lead to
protracted litigation. Access to the issuer's proxy statement (and the
issuer's proxy card) has symbolic value, but if the institutional
investors, who collectively are majority stockholders in many firms,
cannot figure out how to send in the contestant's pink card rather
than the issuer's blue card (figuratively speaking), then shareholder
activism is not ready for prime time.
I. SHAREHOLDER ACCESS TO THE ISSUER'S PROXY STATEMENT: A BRIEF
ACCOUNT
The annual shareholders' meeting is the governance crucible of
the large public firm. Given the large number of shareholders in most
public corporations, it is infeasible for the shareholders to assemble in
a physical space; yet the validity of a vote depends on a large turnout,
if only to satisfy quorum requirements. The practical solution is the
corporation's solicitation of proxies that designate corporate agents to
vote on a shareholder's behalf. The proxy solicitation process has
become a kind of absentee voting system that gives shareholders the
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right to change their vote until the polls close on election day. The
SEC's use of its broad regulatory authority over the proxy solicitation
process, granted by the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, 9 has had a
major impact on U.S. corporate governance. 10 As demonstrated by the
new Compensation Discussion and Analysis requirement, the SEC has
used its power to determine what information is material to the
shareholder's proxy grant decision in order to serve the Commission's
broad corporate governance objectives.' In addition to various issuer-
specific information, the SEC has determined that the issuer's proxy
statement must contain information about certain upcoming
shareholder proposals. The issuer's proxy card must also identify any
shareholder proposal included in the proxy statement and provide
shareholders with an opportunity to vote on it.12
A shareholder may undertake an independent proxy
solicitation on behalf of any matter to be voted on at the annual
meeting, but access to the issuer's proxy statement is nevertheless
highly prized. Through this access, shareholder proponents can avoid
the costs of producing and distributing an independent proxy
statement. Under SEC rules, they also can avoid the disclosure
obligations of a party who is formally soliciting proxies. 13 Moreover,
the ownership requirements for making a shareholder proposal on the
issuer's proxy statement are low-in some cases as little as $2,000 in
shares held for one year. 14 Simply put, most shareholder proposals
that find their way into the issuer's proxy statement would not be
made otherwise.
Two groups have made extensive use of shareholder access to
the issuer's proxy statement: corporate social responsibility ("CSR")
activists and corporate governance activists. Since the 1970s, CSR
activists have presented proposals on a wide range of public policy
9. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2000).
10. For good discussions of the proxy process in American corporate governance on which
some of the following discussion relies, see JESSE CHOPER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS (6th ed. 2004), MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS (10th ed. 2006), and 4 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION
1916-83 (3d ed. 1990).
11. See Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, Securities Act Release No.
8732A, Exchange Act Release No. 54,302A, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,444A, 71
Fed. Reg. 53,158 (Sept. 8, 2006) (mandating detailed compensation disclosure, especially about
often "camouflaged" components, that would allow shareholders to evaluate compensation levels
and board process).
12. See Rule 14a-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(a), (b)(1), (e) (2007) (specifying the form and
content of a proxy statement); Rule 14a-101, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (providing a sample proxy
card). The proxy card need not include proposals that may be excluded from the issuer proxy.
13. Rule 14a-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(1).
14. Rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b).
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issues that corporate actions affect, including matters as diverse as
apartheid in South Africa and global climate change. Since the 1980s,
corporate governance activists have presented proposals relating to a
wide range of internal governance issues, including board structure
(e.g., classification), takeover defensive tactics (e.g., the "poison pill"),
executive compensation (e.g., "golden parachutes"), and the vote
required for director election (majority vs. plurality). Shareholder
proposals have become so much a part of the customary practice in
U.S. corporate governance as to create a market niche for governance
service intermediaries, most notably Institutional Shareholder
Services ("ISS"), which provide analysis, advice, and mechanical
assistance in proxy voting.15
The terms and conditions of access to the issuer's proxy
statement have been a major corporate governance battleground for
several decades. Picking up the general allocation of powers between
shareholders and management in state corporate law, the SEC
permits an issuer to exclude a proposal if it "deals with a matter
relating to the company's ordinary business operations."16 Moreover,
the SEC access rule forces most proposals to be framed as
recommendations for corporate action-as "precatory" rather than
obligatory. Thus, even a proposal approved by a majority of
shareholders is typically not self-executing. Nevertheless, ballot access
has been a potent mechanism in the hands of CSR and corporate
governance activists. This is because management is often eager to
avoid the publicity associated with the proponent's campaign, which
reaches not only other shareholders but also consumers (particularly
important in CSR campaigns), legislators, and regulators.
Management particularly may want to avoid the embarrassment of
rejecting a recommendation that has substantial-or majority-
shareholder support. Being visibly at odds with shareholders is never
a good thing. Thus, proxy access often opens the way to a negotiated
settlement with the shareholder proponent on CSR and governance
issues. The desirability of the agenda influence provided by proxy
access and the meaningfulness of the negotiated concessions have
been hotly debated.
15. For a description of the range of services, see the ISS website, ISS Governance Services,
http://www.issproxy.com/issgovernance.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2008). ISS produces annual
reports that summarize the year's important proxy issues, including the degree of shareholder
support, which are available at the ISS Governance Bookstore, http://www.issproxy.com
bookstore/index.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2008).
16. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(7).
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II. OUR REGULATORY MOMENT
The current regulatory debate is over shareholder access to the
issuer proxy (and proxy card) in connection with the nomination of
directors. One "red line" that the SEC has maintained throughout
various formulations of the access conditions has been that the
shareholder proposal cannot relate to a particular election of directors.
Justifications for this constraint have varied over time, but the effect
has been to rule out a low-cost mechanism for a shareholder insurgent
to reach fellow shareholders in a director election. The SEC rule is
thus in synch with the standard state law rules that produce
reimbursement only if the insurgent wins control of the board;
together these rules maintain a high cost barrier to waging a proxy
contest. Critics would say that the state law rule embodies classic
incumbent entrenchment, providing evidence that jurisdictional
competition for incorporations is geared toward appealing to
managerial interests. On this view, the SEC's position flows from
similar managerial pressure, albeit applied in a different rulemaking
venue. Defenders of the SEC's position would see the constraint as
appreciating the potential disruption from an ever-present threat of a
director election contest, and thus as legitimately avoiding a low-cost
workaround of the desirable barriers erected by state reimbursement
rules. In its recent public pronouncements, the SEC has articulated a
narrower policy claim, asserting that the constraint is necessary to
assure that a nominator could not evade the disclosure requirements
that are appropriate in an election contest.
17
Over the past fifteen years, corporate governance activists have
paid increasing attention to the election of directors. Joe Grundfest's
1993 article, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with
Barbarians Inside the Gates,18 was an important intervention. Writing
in the wake of judicial decisions and state statutes that appeared to
permit management to "just say no" to a hostile bid, Grundfest
proposed that institutional investors could signal their dismay with
poor corporate performance by withholding their vote for the
reelection of directors as a group: in other words, to "just vote no."
17. Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, Exchange Act Release No.
56,161, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,914, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,488, 43,490.93 (Aug. 3,
2007) ('The purpose of [Rule 14a-8(i)(8)] is to prevent the circumvention of other proxy rules that
are carefully crafted to ensure that investors receive adequate disclosure and an opportunity to
make informed voting decisions in election contests.").
18. 45 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1993). The article is based on a proposal that Professor Grundfest
first made to the Council of Institutional Investors in November 1990. Id. at 866 n.32.
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Grundfest contemplated that this public display of disapproval would
be symbolic only, but "[s]ymbols ... have consequences."'19
Over time, "just vote no" or "withhold vote" campaigns have
become an important feature of the governance landscape. In an
important evolutionary twist, the campaigns moved away from
omnibus rejection of the entire board to targeted rejection of particular
directors. This development was spurred by the governance failures
that became apparent in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Governance
troubles at the Walt Disney Company provide two instructive
examples. Disney shareholders, distressed by the roughly $100 million
severance payment received by short-time president Michael Ovitz,
could "just vote no" against the members of the compensation
committee. Shareholders who thought Disney's flagging performance
showed the declining effectiveness of long-time CEO Michael Eisner
could also vote "no" on his reelection to the board. Shortly after
receiving a substantial fraction of negative votes, Eisner did indeed
depart. 2
0
Similarly, following the wave of financial restatements that
came after Enron-related reforms, angry shareholders turned on audit
committee members who either had failed to oversee the audit process
adequately or failed otherwise in their disclosure monitoring duties.21
Specific audit committee members became the target of withhold vote
campaigns. These targeted campaigns had more sting because of their
ad hominem character; they could inflict reputational harm on the
director in question. Withhold vote campaigns were also used to
promote general corporate governance standards. 22 For example, an
institutional investor might withhold its vote for a director who served
on more boards than the institution believed consistent with good
governance.
The limits of targeted withhold vote campaigns produced the
next election-related governance reform. Under the charter or bylaw
19. Id. at 866.
20. Laura M. Holson & Geraldine Fabrikant, Disney Chief to Leave, Setting Off Race for
Job, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2004, at Al.
21. See Suraj Srinivasan, Consequences of Financial Reporting Failure for Outside
Directors: Evidence from Accounting Restatements, 43 J. ACCT. RES. 291, 331 (2005) ("[F]or severe
restatements the likelihood of departure is higher for audit committee members, who have direct
responsibility for overseeing the financial reporting process, than for non-audit committee
directors.").
22. Descriptive evidence of the effects of withhold vote campaigns is provided by Diane Del
Guercio et al., Do Boards Pay Attention when Institutional Investors 'Just Vote No'?: CEO and
Director Turnover Associated with Shareholder Activism 13-32 (June 2006) (unpublished




provisions of the typical firm, election of a director required only a
plurality vote. As long as a quorum was present, a simple majority of
those voting "for" or "against" was sufficient to elect a director, even if
a large fraction of shareholders withheld its vote. Because these
directors were not formally defeated, they could set aside the
embarrassment of shareholder disapprobation and take their seats on
the board. This led governance activists to push firms to adopt voting
rules that required majority support (not just plurality) for director
election. So, to provide a simple example, if one hundred shares were
present and voting at the meeting, a withhold vote of fifty-one percent
would defeat a candidate's election. Some large public firms complied
with this request, formally changing their voting rules. Other firms
adopted a variant, in which the failure to obtain majority support
would oblige a director to tender a resignation. The board could then
decide whether to accept the resignation.
23
By the early 2000s, withhold vote campaigns-although by now
an accepted governance tool-increasingly appeared too anemic a
countermeasure for the governance abuses that seemed to unravel
daily in the business press. 24 Even if a withhold vote campaign might
force out particular directors, it could not install their successors.
Governance activists (particularly institutional investors) wanted
shareholders to have more power over director nominations as a way
of ensuring the election of a group of directors who would be
independent from management. Their goal was not a board majority;
the institutions did not have a control motive. Yet the only available
option, a regular proxy contest, was unpromising because of cost and
free rider problems. A prior SEC reform adopted in 1992 to facilitate
institutional investor nominations was commonly regarded as
ineffective. Although a contestant could make a solicitation that filled
out a "short slate" of its nominees with management's nominees (even
23. For a useful summary of the issue, see Council on Institutional Investors, Majority
Voting Primer: Making Shareowners' Votes Count: Majority Voting in Director Elections (Feb. 27,
2006), http://www.cii.org/policiesJMajorityVotingPrimer.pdf. See also CLAUDIA H. ALLEN, STUDY
OF MAJORITY VOTING IN DIRECTOR ELECTIONS (2007), http://www.ngelaw.com/files/upload/
majorityscallen_020707.pdf (finding that as of February 2007 approximately 50% of the S&P 500
firms had adopted a majority vote policy, bylaw, and/or charter amendment, although only 40%
made majority vote an absolute requirement for director election). For discussion of a recent
amendment to Delaware corporate law that enables shareholders to adopt bylaw amendments
relating to majority voting that cannot, in turn, be diluted by the board, see J.W. Verret,
Pandora's Ballot Box, or a Proxy with Moxie? Majority Voting, Corporate Ballot Access, and the
Legend of Martin Lipton Re-Examined, 62 BUS. LAW. 1007 (2007).
24. The evidence in Del Guercio et al., supra note 22 (manuscript at 27), finds that focused
"vote no" campaigns are "effective in both pressuring the board to act and underperforming
directors to resign," suggesting that "withhold vote" campaigns may be more successful at forcing
director turnover than institutional investors fully appreciated.
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without the consent of those nominees),25 the contestant's solicitation
was otherwise subject to the standard rules.
In response to the building sense of a governance crisis, the
SEC in 2003 tabled a proposal designed to facilitate institutional voice
in the nomination of directors. 26 In a nutshell, the proposal would
have given a five-percent shareholder (or group) a right of "direct
access" to the issuer proxy statement to make director nominations.
This right was quite constrained, however. First, the access right was
conditioned on certain "triggering events"-either a large (greater
than thirty-five percent) withhold vote for a director nominee in the
year immediately preceding the nomination, or majority shareholder
approval of a direct access proposal made by a significant (greater
than one percent) shareholder in a prior year. Second, direct access
would be limited to longtime holders (more than one year) without a
control motive. Third, the maximum number of nominees ranged from
one (for a board of no more than eight) to three (for a board of at least
twenty).
The proposal stirred intense debate. 27 Proponents saw the
SEC's proposal as a modest effort to inject director independence and
accountability into the corporate governance system by empowering a
class of long-term stakeholders in U.S. public equity markets.
Opponents saw the proposal as SEC meddling in corporate governance
that would have an unpredictable-and likely deleterious-effect on
the efficient functioning of U.S. public firms and, thus, the U.S.
economy. A divided SEC did not adopt the proposal, and it ultimately
faded away despite never being formally withdrawn. After the 2004
25. See Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange Act Release No.
31,326, Investment Company Act Release No. 19,031, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,276 (Oct. 22, 1992)
(amending Rule 14a-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(d), "to allow shareholders who seek minority
representation on the board of directors to seek proxy authority to vote for one or more of
management's nominees, so long as the names of non-consenting nominees do not appear on the
dissident's form of proxy or in the dissident's proxy statement").
26. See Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,626,
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,206, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784, 60,785 (Oct. 23, 2003) ("In the
broad proxy revisions adopted in 1992, the Commission briefly revisited the security holder
nominee issue .... [T]he Commission noted 'the difficulty experienced by shareholders in
gaining a voice in determining the composition of the board of directors .... -).
27. For a sample, see Symposium on Corporate Elections, 59 Bus. Law. 43 (2003). Comment
letters received by the SEC are posted at U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Comments
on Proposed Rule: Security Holder Director Nominations, http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/
s71903.shtml (last visited Feb. 1, 2008) and summarized at U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, Summary of Comments, http://www.sec.gov/rules/extra/s71903summary.htm (last
visited Feb. 1, 2008) and Div. of Corporate Fin., Supplemental Summary of Comments Received




election, when Chairman Cox replaced Chairman Donaldson, the
proposal was taken off the table.
28
Corporate governance activists responded by looking to self-
help, pursuing shareholder adoption of bylaws that would open the
issuer's proxy to director nominations by shareholders-that is, direct
access via bylaw amendment rather than by SEC rule. 29 The AFSCME
v. A!G litigation arose out of such a campaign. AFSCME, a public
employees' union and established corporate governance activist,
offered such an amendment for inclusion in AIG's proxy, pursuant to
Rule 14a-8.30 AIG sought SEC staff blessing to exclude the proposal,
contending that the proposal fell within a provision that permits the
exclusion of a proposal that "relates to an election for membership on
the company's board of directors or analogous governing body."
31
AFSCME argued that its proposal was just a bylaw amendment-a
governance change that did not relate to "an election" (meaning a
particular election), unlike the nomination of an opposing director
candidate. The SEC, joining AIG's cause through an amicus brief,
argued that the exclusion meant to cover a shareholder proposal that
"would result in contested elections." 32 After conducting a detailed
review of the administrative history of the exclusionary language, the
Second Circuit decided that the SEC's position conflicted with the
Commission's 1976 adopting release, which had targeted particular
elections, not election reform proposals like AFSCME's, which "would
establish the procedural rules governing elections generally."
33
The decision could have "opened the floodgates" to direct access
to the issuer proxy for shareholder nominations on terms much
broader than the failed 2003 SEC proposal.3 4 Subject to shareholder
approval, of course, the nominator ownership threshold might well be
28. This is apparent from the 2007 issuer proxy access proposals discussed below, see infra
text accompanying notes 36-44, which refer to the 2003 proposal but reach different conclusions.
29. Shareholders ordinarily have concurrent power with the board to amend the
corporation's bylaws. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §109 (2001). What happens if the board in turn
amends the bylaws to undermine the shareholder initiative -- a "battle of bylaw amendments" --
is unresolved. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, "Just Say Never?" Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and
Shareholder-Adopted Bylaw Amendments: An Essay for Warren Buffett, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 511,
550 n.150 (1997).
30. Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees (AFSCME)) v. Am. Int'l Group, Inc., 462
F.3d 121, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2007)).
31. Id. at 124 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(8)).
32. Id. at 126.
33. Id. at 130.
34. See, e.g., GEORGESON, 2006 ANNUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW 2 (2006),
http://www.georgeson.com/usa/download/news/2006_ACGRFINAL.pdf ("[A] recent court ruling
is expected to open the floodgates in 2007 for shareholder proposals that would request boards of
target companies to adopt proxy access for shareholders.").
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set lower than the five-percent figure in the SEC's 2003 proposal, and
the number of possible nominations would not necessarily be capped.
Note how the process would work. In year one, assume that
shareholders adopt a direct access bylaw. In year two, the issuer is
obliged, per the bylaw, to include the shareholder nominations in its
proxy statement. The exclusionary provisions of Rule 14a-8 are, after
all, permissive: an issuer always can choose to include a proposal that
it otherwise could exclude. 35 The bylaw would establish as a matter of
corporate policy that proposals should be included.
The court made it clear, however, that it was not taking sides
in the policy debate and that the SEC was free to amend or to clarify
the rule through appropriate administrative action. 36 The SEC
immediately faced conflicting pressure from both management and
institutional investors. After nearly a year's cogitation, the SEC
offered two proposals. The first followed the Second Circuit's
invitation to adopt its preferred interpretation of the Rule 14a-8
election exclusion via reasoned administrative action.37 The second
would have permitted a five-percent shareholder (or group) without a
control motive to propose a proxy access bylaw similar to the AFSCME
proposal. If shareholders adopted the bylaw, similar proponents would
be permitted to nominate director candidates through the issuer's
proxy. 38 As discussed below, the proposal would have required rather
extraordinary disclosure from both the proponent of the election
reform and the actual shareholder nominator. For this reason, both
the activist investor community and the business community rejected
the direct access proposal. Instead, a divided SEC adopted the
proposal that purported to codify its "longstanding policy" that blocked
the Rule 14a-8 route to issuer proxy access. 39 Chairman Cox defended
the action as merely "maintain[ing] the status quo of the past decade,"
while gamely promising "to move forward and re-open the discussion
35. See AFSCME, 462 F.3d at 130 n.9 ("Even if proxy access bylaw proposals were
excludable under Rule 14a-8(i)(8), a company could nevertheless decide to include the proposal in
its proxy statement .... ").
36. Id. at 130 n.9, 131.
37. Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, Exchange Act Release No.
56,161, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,914, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,488, 43,491 (Aug. 3, 2007).
38. Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 56,160, Investment Company Act
Release No. 27,913, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,466, 43,472 (Aug. 3, 2007).
39. Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, Exchange Act Release No.
56,914, Investment Company Act Release No. 28,075, 72 Fed. Reg. 70,450 (Dec. 11, 2007); Press
Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, supra note 2. Subsequent to AFSCME v. AG, a unanimous
Supreme Court reversed another Second Circuit case that had held an administrative agency to
a prior interpretation of its rules. Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 127 S. Ct. 2339
(2007). This makes it more likely that other circuits, including the Second Circuit itself, will
refuse to follow AFSCME v. AG in a subsequent case.
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in 2008."40 The encroaching political season makes the necessary
consensus an unlikely prospect. Thus, it could be that possible entr~e
to the issuer's proxy statement for shareholder nominations raised by
the 2003 proposal will be precluded by the 2007 determinations.
III. E-PROXY AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR SHAREHOLDER ACCESS TO THE
ISSUER'S PROXY STATEMENT
If the window to the issuer's proxy statement is slammed shut,
does it matter? The answer, after the recent adoption of so-called "e-
proxy rules" that permit an insurgent to post materials for internet
access, is "not so much."
Effective as of the 2008 proxy season, the SEC has adopted
rules that require issuers to post all proxy materials on a public
website (in addition to the standard EDGAR postings on the SEC's
site) and to provide shareholders with the option of "paper delivery" or
"notice and access." 41 In terms of mechanics, the issuer sends a notice
to all shareholders informing them of the availability of the web-
posted proxy materials and of their right to receive a paper copy (via a
request by mail, phone, email, or a web form). The notice must also
give shareholders the opportunity to opt permanently into paper
delivery. Web posting of proxy materials via the notice and access
model must include a means to vote, which can be either a
downloadable proxy card or direct electronic voting. The paper
delivery model looks very much like the traditional proxy
solicitation.
42
A "soliciting person other than the issuer"-such as a
shareholder nominator- also must comply with the notice and access
model. 43 The model gives the nominator the flexibility to solicit some
shareholders via notice and access and others via paper delivery.
44
40. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, supra note 2.
41. Shareholder Choice Regarding Proxy Materials, Exchange Act Release No. 56,135,
Investment Company Act Release No. 27,911, 72 Fed. Reg. 42,222 (Aug. 1, 2007). Large public
issuers (i.e., those with a public float of at least $700 million who otherwise qualify as
"accelerated filers") are subject to the rules for the 2008 season. Coverage for all other public
companies begins in the 2009 season. Id. at 42,223 n.17. The rules replace a recently adopted
program in which issuers could opt voluntarily into a regime that would give shareholders a
choice of whether to receive proxy materials in paper form or electronically. Rule 14a-16, 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-16(a)(1) (2007) (effective Jan. 1, 2008).
42. The principle difference is that the shareholder has opted into a paper-delivery
solicitation regime after having received a notice about the web-based alternative.
43. This account is based on the SEC release, Shareholder Choice Regarding Proxy
Materials, 72 Fed. Reg. at 42,227-28.
44. The prior regime permitted solicitation of specific institutional investors-by paper-
without undertaking an obligation to print and mail to every shareholder.
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One crucial difference is that the shareholder nominator, unlike the
issuer, is not obliged to solicit every shareholder; the nominator need
not supply a proxy statement to unsolicited shareholders. For
example, the nominator "can choose to send Notices only to those
shareholders who have not previously requested paper copies."45 This
means that the nominator can simply post its proxy materials on a
website and limit its solicitees to those for whom solicitation costs are
probably low. To reach that group, the nominator's only initial costs
are printing and postage for a one-page notice. Although the notice
must give the shareholder recipient the right to request paper
delivery, the shareholder's initial selection of web access for the
issuer's materials is likely to carry over to a proxy contest.
46
Additionally, institutional investors, who generally may request paper
delivery to minimize their own printing costs, could agree to web
delivery for such solicitations as a way to encourage them. A trade
association, such as the Council of Institutional Investors, could help
to create the practice. Further tailoring could come from a screening
process for nominators run through the Council or through a proxy
advisory service like ISS.
The avoided printing and mailing costs look substantial. The
SEC cites the leading proxy services provider's estimate of average
printing and mailing costs of $5.64 per set of proxy materials in the
2006 proxy season. 47 By contrast, the SEC estimates that printing and
mailing a notice costs $0.42 per solicitee and that the costs of setting
up a website are negligible. 48 For a nominator who wants to solicit
1,000 institutional investors via the notice and access method only,
this can bring the distribution element of solicitation costs into the
$1,000 range-not much of a budgetary strain for any serious
corporate governance activist. In any event, the SEC believes that the
"flexibility" of the e-proxy system "ultimately may reduce the cost of
engaging in proxy contests, thereby increasing the effectiveness and
45. Shareholder Choice Regarding Proxy Materials, 72 Fed. Reg. at 42,228 & n.88. The
footnote refers to the issuer's obligation to send out the notice to the tailored shareholder group
that has not previously sought paper delivery, if the nominator so chooses, or to supply the
tailored mailing list.
46. Under the original e-proxy proposal, such a nominator would have been able to
condition a solicitation on the notice recipient opting for web-access, whereas the rule itself
requires the nominator to offer paper delivery to anyone who receives the original notice. See
Internet Availability of Proxy Materials, Exchange Act Release No. 55,146, Investment Company
Act Release No. 27,671, 72 Fed. Reg. 4148, 4158 (Jan. 29, 2007).
47. Shareholder Choice Regarding Proxy Materials, 72 Fed. Reg. at 42,230-31 (estimate by
ADP, the leading intermediary, now known as Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc.).
48. Id. at 42,232.
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efficiency of proxy contests as a source of discipline in the corporate
governance process."
4 9
So what is the difference to shareholder nominators in losing
access to the issuer proxy but having resort to an independent
solicitation waged via e-proxy? Is the symbolic difference a substantive
one? If the principal consequence, aside from a relatively small cost
differential, is only to exclude the gadfly nominator who cannot handle
the additional complexity, then the difference cannot count for much,
and may even be desirable from a policy perspective. There is,
however, also the loss of a side-by-side comparison of the nominator's
case (limited to 500 words) 50 and management's response; perhaps
more importantly, there is the loss of a proxy card or e-form that
shows competing candidates and looks more like a familiar ballot.51
But realistically, the large firm that typically has been targeted by
institutional investor activism will have a high percentage of
institutional holders. Many of the institutions will look to ISS or other
advisory firms for guidance on how to vote in a contested election.
Other significant shareholders, who may rely on internal deliberation,
should be able to put competing sets of materials side by side. If large
shareholders or their intermediaries cannot manage to fill out and
send back the "pink" card rather than the "blue" card or make similar
adjustments in e-voting, then shareholder activism still has a long
way to go.
One possible response to a "triviality" contention about issuer
proxy access focuses on the other costs of freestanding proxy
contests-in particular, the costs of drafting a proxy statement that
meets the disclosure requirements under Rule 14a-9,52 given the
potential litigation risks of management pushback. By contrast, the
only affirmative representation required of a shareholder proponent
under 14a-8 concerns its ownership interest in the issuer's stock. 53 But
this response rests on a faulty premise: it assumes that a direct access
system might evolve in which a nominator could avoid a significant
disclosure obligation. Why would shareholders vote for such a system?
49. Id. at 42,231. The SEC hastens to add that this particular rule change will nevertheless
"not change significantly the number" of proxy contestants because the preexisting "voluntary"
model already permitted use of an access and notice model for them. Id. This may be a cute way
of deflecting objection that the mandatory e-proxy rule will, by design, lend aid and comfort to
shareholder empowerment advocates. Yet one important difference under the mandatory "notice
and access" model is that a firm will inevitably identify shareholders who are satisfied with
website access only-that is, a pool of low-cost solicitees.
50. Rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(d) (2007).
51. Shareholder Choice Regarding Proxy Materials, 72 Fed. Reg. at 42,224.
52. Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(a).
53. Id. § 240.14a-8(b)(2).
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Even the proposed shareholder bylaw controverted in AFSCME v. AIG
required the nominator to make disclosures that tracked and
referenced important elements of a freestanding proxy statement and
to assume "all liability of any violation of law or regulation arising out
of the Nominator's communications with stockholders, including the
Disclosure . .. .54
Moreover, there is no reason to think that, for a shareholder-
adopted direct access regime, the SEC would passively rely on an
issuer bylaw to assure adequate disclosure. In this regard, the SEC's
policy-based defense of the exclusion of the bylaw proposal in
AFSCME v. AG-that it could lead to an election contest without
adequate disclosure-was disingenuous.5 5 It is true that, under the
current rules, a shareholder nominator would not have engaged in a
''solicitation" merely by presenting a director alternative in the
issuer's proxy statement (and on the issuer's proxy card) and thus
would have assumed no additional disclosure obligation. 58 The current
rules make the issuer the party who solicits the proxy; the nominator
just wants to add another name.57 Indeed, a nominator can engage in
significant campaigning on behalf of the nominee without triggering a
further disclosure obligation.5 But the SEC could protect the
important policy objective of assuring disclosure appropriate for
director elections without constraining shareholder choice over direct
access. In the simplest version, it could add a provision to Rule 14a-8
that made a direct access bylaw excludable unless it contained a
disclosure undertaking like the proposed resolution in AFSCME v.
AJG.59 Alternatively, it could prescribe a form of disclosure that a
shareholder nominator would prepare for inclusion in the issuer's
54. AFSCME v. Am. Int'l Group, Inc., 462 F.3d 121, 124 n.3 (2d Cir. 2006).
55. Id. at 130 n.9.
56. See Rule 14a-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1(/) (defining a solicitation).
57. This is spun out in the SEC's release "codifying" its "longstanding practice."
Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, Exchange Act Release No. 56,914,
Investment Company Act Release No. 28,075, 72 Fed. Reg. 70,450, 70,450-51 (Dec. 11, 2007).
58. In general, efforts to persuade a shareholder to "execute or not to execute" a proxy count
act as a "solicitation," which could lead to a disclosure obligation. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1(l)(1)(ii);
see Rule 14a-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (noting an obligation to file a proxy statement prior to
making a solicitation). But the nominator publicizing its own voting intentions and its reasons
for them would not be a "solicitation." 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1l)(2)(iv). Moreover, a nominator
without a control motive could make a solicitation without incurring a disclosure obligation so
long as the nominator did not seek "the power to act as proxy." Rule 14a-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-
2(b)(1).
59. This was pointed out by Commissioner Nazareth in her dissent to the SEC's
"codification" rule. Annette L. Nazareth, Comm'r, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Speech by SEC




proxy statement in the event that shareholders had adopted a direct
access bylaw. So the key policy questions are: first, what kind of
disclosure is appropriate in the case of a shareholder nomination, and
second, should the answer be different for a shareholder using issuer
proxy access versus a freestanding proxy contest?
IV. THE DISCLOSURE DILEMMA
In the case of a shareholder nomination, there are two
potential areas for disclosure: disclosure about the director nominee
and disclosure about the nominator. That there should be extensive
disclosure about the director nominee is not controversial. In its initial
release responding to AFSCME v. AIG, the SEC described the salient
items of nominee disclosure under a freestanding proxy contest as
follows:
* Any arrangement or understanding between the nominee and
any other person(s) (naming such person(s)) pursuant to which
the nominee was or is selected as a nominee;
* Business experience of the nominee;
* Any other directorships held by the nominee in an Exchange Act
reporting company;
* The nominee's involvement in certain legal proceedings;
* Certain transactions between the nominee and the company;
and
* Whether the nominee complies with independence
requirements. 60
The shareholder resolution in AFSCME v. AG called for disclosure of
this information.
61
A freestanding proxy contest also requires disclosure of certain
nominator-specific information. In the same release, the SEC
described the salient disclosure items as follows:
* By whom the solicitation is made;
* The methods to be employed to solicit;
* Total expenditures to date and anticipated in connection with
the solicitation;
60. Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, Exchange Act Release No.
56,161, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,914, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,488, 43,490 (Aug. 3, 2007)
(footnotes omitted) (describing disclosure required by Schedule 14A, Items 7(a), (b), and (c)).
61. 462 F.3d at 124 n.3. The resolution called for the nominee disclosure required by
Schedule 14A, Items 7(a), (b), and (c).
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* By whom the cost of the solicitation will be borne;
* Any substantial interest of each participant in the solicitation;
* The name, address, and principal occupation or principal
business of each participant;
* Whether any participant has been convicted in a criminal
proceeding within the past 10 years;
* The amount of each class of securities of the company owned by
the participant and the participant's associates;
* Information concerning purchases and sales of the company's
securities by each participant within the past two years;
* Whether any part of the purchase price or market value of each
security is represented by fund borrowed;
* Whether a participant is a party to any contract, arrangements,
or understandings with any person with respect to securities of
the company;
* Certain related party transactions between the participant or its
associates and the company;
* Whether the participant or any of its associates have any
arrangement or understanding with any person with respect to
any future employment with the company or its affiliates, or
with respect to any future transactions to which the company
or its affiliates will or may be a party; and
* With respect to any person who is a party to an arrangement or
understanding pursuant to which a nominee is proposed to be
elected, any substantial interest that such person has in any
matter to be acted upon at a meeting.
62
Nominator-specific information is more costly to provide
because it offers more fertile ground for the exploration of possible
disclosure violations. Extensive disclosure seems appropriate where
the nominator may have a control motive-indeed, may solicit on
behalf of a full slate of director nominees-and also where the
nominator may have a strong economic interest in making good on a
substantial investment in the issuer's stock, perhaps as the result of
recent accumulation (or through derivative transactions). However,
the shareholder resolution in AFSCME v. AIG did not call for
disclosure of this information.
63
62. Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, 72 Fed. Reg. at 43,489-90
(footnotes omitted).
63. 462 F.3d at 124 n.3. The only required nominator-specific disclosure for access to the
issuer proxy was with respect to the nominator's ownership stake in the issuer. Id. I surmise
that the proponents are counting on the proxy rules to block disclosure-free access by a control
entrepreneur. Such parties are likely to want to engage in a "solicitation" to increase the chance
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What disclosure should be required of a nominator seeking
access to the issuer's proxy? One possible set of distinctions might be
based on the nominator's disavowal of any control motive. Presumably
this would distinguish between nominations by an investor and
nominations by a control entrepreneur; it also would distinguish
between "short slate" campaigns and "majority slate" campaigns,
where control necessarily would be at stake. The SEC has tacitly
approved this kind of distinction by permitting a five-percent holder
who disavows a control motive to submit a summary filing on a Form
13G rather than on a Form 13D, which requires extensive
shareholder-specific disclosure similar to the nominator-specific
disclosure of a freestanding proxy contest.64 Indeed, the current proxy
rules apparently permit a Form 13G filer to make a "solicitation"
without triggering a further disclosure obligation, so long as the filer
does not seek "power to act as proxy for a security holder" and does not
distribute proxy cards.6
5
It also might be reasonable to gear nominator disclosure to the
number of board nominees (relative to board size) to reflect the
potential for significant influence short of control. Nomination of one
or two directors on a large board by a party without a control motive
reasonably might trigger less nominator disclosure than nomination of
a larger fraction of the board. Nominator disclosure also needs to take
account of newly emerging possibilities for "empty voting" or "hidden
voting" made possible by derivatives markets. 66
As noted above, part of the SEC's response to AFSCME v. AIG
was to propose a new version of issuer proxy access. 67 Qualifying
shareholder proponents could use proxy access to propose a bylaw that
would permit access for similarly qualifying proponents to make
director nominations in a subsequent year.68  The eligibility
requirements were stiff: five-percent share ownership for at least a
year and no control motive.69 Remarkably, the proposed disclosure
requirements appeared to encompass matters extending far beyond
the disclosure in a freestanding proxy contest-including contacts
of a success and will have crossed the five-percent ownership threshold that will make them a
13D filer, and thus subject to a disclosure obligation, if they solicit. See 17 C.F.R, § 240.14a-
2(b)(1)(vi) (broadening coverage for 13D filers); cf. supra note 58.
64. Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 56,160, Investment Company Act
Release No. 27,913, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,466, 43,472 (Aug. 3, 2007).
65. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(1)(vi); see supra notes 56, 63 and accompanying text.
66. See generally Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard S. Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty
Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811 (2006).
67. See supra text accompanying notes 37-40.
68. Shareholder Proposals, 72 Fed. Reg. at 43,466.
69. Id. at 43,472.
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with a proxy advisory firm, detailed history as to when the
shareholder formulated plans to make its proposal or nomination, and
an account of contacts between the proponent and management (or
directors) of the targeted issuer.70 The proposal also called for
extensive disclosure about natural persons who are the agents of
shareholder proponents or nominators. This included how such
persons are selected (for example, whether by election of the ultimate
beneficiaries of the entity), the fiduciary duty of such agents to the
beneficiaries, the "qualifications and background of such person or
persons relevant to the plan or proposals," and any interests not
shared with other shareholders of the issuer.71 The proposal would
have required specific disclosure about contracts with the issuer,
including "any employment agreement, collective bargaining
agreement or consulting agreement." 72
As noted before, the costs to a proponent (or nominator)
directly increase with the expanded scope and detail of disclosure
because of heightened liability exposure.7 3 Nominee disclosure seems
highly relevant to a shareholder decision. Shareholders need to know
the background, experience, and possible conflicts of any director
candidate. Disclosure tailored to a proponent (or nominator) is much
less straightforward. In significant measure, such disclosure seems
premised on the view that the proposed action is less about the actual
director election than about a bargaining game between
proponent/nominator and the issuer over a side issue, including
private interests, unrelated to the optimal governance of the firm.
That concern seems attenuated where the proponent/nominator is, by
hypothesis, a substantial long-term holder without a control motive. It
is ironic indeed to insist on more demanding disclosure criteria for
access to the issuer proxy statement than in the case of a freestanding
proxy contest. Is there any reason not to turn to e-proxy solicitations
over a more costly alternative?
V. CONCLUSION
Some of the implications of this analysis are straightforward.
Institutional investors were right to line up en masse against the
SEC's issuer proxy access proposal. It was fools' gold, and dangerous.
The detailed disclosure called for by the SEC proposal was an
70. Id.
71. Id. at 43,473.
72. Id. at 43,472.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 3, 54, and 63-64.
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invitation to litigation. Because some of the required disclosure
pertained to the natural persons who control the institutional
nominator, they would have faced personal litigation risk. 74 Given that
an institution benefits from improved corporate performance only in
proportion to its share ownership and the institution's officers hardly
at all, the costs to the institutional and individual actors of pursuing
or using issuer proxy access on these terms would easily outweigh the
benefits. Also dangerous was the possibility that the "agency
capitalism" disclosures of issuer proxy access would find their way into
disclosure requirements in a freestanding proxy solicitation. This
could have happened implicitly, through an expanded conception of
"materiality," or through explicit rule changes as management (in
particular) noticed the asymmetry between the disclosure regimes.
Similarly, it was no great loss that the SEC closed the door on
shareholder bylaw proposals for issuer proxy access. Under any
system of issuer proxy access, the SEC will surely seek to regulate the
disclosure associated with director nominations. To behave otherwise
would be arguably inconsistent with the SEC's core mandate under
section 14(a) of the 1934 Act. As the SEC's most recent proxy access
proposal suggests, the disclosure requirements may be a poison pill.
Even the more institutionally friendly SEC access proposals of 2003
were a cumbersome tangle borne of political compromise. 75 Moreover,
because of the focus on "long term" investors, both the 2003 and 2007
proxy access proposals excluded by design activist shareholders who
might run "short slate" campaigns with more focused economic
objectives.7 6 Nor did issuer proxy access address many of the
longstanding sources of institutional investors' reluctance to nominate
directors-for example, the threat of "short swing sale" liability under
section 16(b) of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act because of
directors who they may have "deputized."
77
Instead of investing more energy on issuer proxy access,
institutional investors and other shareholder activists should focus on
working through the mechanics of waging short slate proxy contests
74. See, e.g., Shareholder Proposals, 72 Fed. Reg. at 43,474 (describing personal liability
faced by individuals).
75. See supra text accompanying notes 26-28.
76. See Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm
Performance (European Corporate Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 139/2006,
2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=948907. April Klein &
Emanuel Zur, Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors
(European Corporate Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 140/2006, 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractj_id=913362.




using e-proxy solicitations. 78 The Council on Institutional Investors
and public interest law firms could play a significant role in this
regard. Activist institutions need to prepare the disclosure package
required under the existing proxy rules. An institution's disclosure
may be tested (and refined) through litigation, but a standardized
package that institutions without a control motive could generally use
in proxy contests should emerge relatively quickly. Activist
institutions need to become adept with the web access model and
appreciate the extent to which proxy advisory services will do much of
the actual solicitation. It may be that few institutions will have
sufficient incentive to make the relatively modest investment to
master the mechanics necessary to undertake an e-proxy contest. 79 It
also may be that few shareholders will take the trouble to engage with
the substance of the proxy contest if it involves going beyond the four
corners of the issuer's proxy. If so, the role of institutional investors in
corporate governance necessarily will be limited.
Behind the SEC's response to AFSCME v. AIG is deep unease
over "agency capitalism." We might be more concerned about the
motives of agents of institutional investors precisely because those
agents do not face high-powered economic incentives. When Carl
Icahn makes the solicitation, we understand what he is about and the
risks of which shareholders ought to be apprised. Institutional
investors in this emerging world of "cohesive diffuse ownership"80 do
not fit the paradigm so easily. Their agents cannot earn enormous
salaries or take profits from a successful investment. What exactly
will they maximize? Thus begins the tough analysis of the
consequences of shareholder empowerment, which seems, to me,
inevitable.
78. Alternatively, or as a supplement, institutions should also consider waging e-proxy
campaigns on behalf of shareholder bylaws that would mandate issuer proxy access, see supra
text accompanying note 34, but should also appreciate that success will likely induce further
(and appropriate) SEC response to protect its disclosure regime. On the other hand, the outcome
of the 2008 election could affect any proposal that eventually emerges.
79. See Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, On Beyond CalPERS: Survey Evidence on the
Developing Role of Public Pension Funds in Corporate Governance, 61 VAND. L. REV. 315, 317-18
(2008) (finding little non-litigation institutional governance activity).
80. See Armour & Gordon, supra note 7 (describing ownership pattern in which
shareholders of diffusely owned firms are typically institutional investors, rather than retail
shareholders, such that the coordination costs for shareholder action are much lower).
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